State v. Brown Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 38347 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-9-2013
State v. Brown Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 38347
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation












BONNER COUNTY NO. CR 2007-2454 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
HONORABLE FRED GIBLER 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
SPENCER J. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8576 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 





TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. ...................................................................... 2 
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................... 3 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Brown's Motion To 
Exclude From Evidence Defendant's Mail Correspondence 
Obtained In Violation Of The Fourth Amendment .......................................... 3 
CONCLUSiON ...................................................................................................... 6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 7 
Cases 
Mallery v. Lewis, 106 Idaho 227 (1984) ............................................................ 3, 5 
State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007) .................................................................... .4 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On appeal, Mr. Brown asserts that the district court erred in denying several of 
his pre-trial motions, from which he reserved the right to appeal as part of a conditional 
guilty plea to charges of voluntary manslaughter and accessory after the fact to grand 
theft, and abused its discretion with respect to his Rule 35 motion. In its Respondent's 
Brief, the State makes a number of arguments, including claiming that Mr. Brown's 
Motion to Exclude Mail Correspondence was properly denied. This Reply Brief is 
necessary to respond to the State's argument on that issue. With respect to the State's 
other arguments, Mr. Brown will rely on the arguments set forth in his Appellant's Brief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Brown's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown's Motion to Exclude from Evidence 
Defendant's Mail Correspondence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Brown's Motion To Exclude From Evidence 
Defendant's Mail Correspondence Obtained In Violation Of The Fourth Amendment 
In advancing its argument against Mr. Brown's claim, the State misunderstands 
and misrepresents the scope of Mr. Brown's argument, and incorrectly argues that a 
factual basis was established to support the district court's factual findings when no 
evidence was presented to support the findings. The State's argument suffers from a 
further flaw in that it relies on an overly-broad reading of the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision in Mallery v. Lewis, 106 Idaho 227 (1984). 
With respect to its misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Mr. Brown's 
argument, the State asserts, "The district court found there was a jail policy in place 
'regarding communications from prisoners' (Tr., p.371, L.25 - p.372, L.2), and this 
finding has not been challenged." (Respondent's Brief, p.9 (emphasis added).) This is 
absolutely false. In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Brown argued, inter alia, "In making its 
ruling, the district court assumed the existence of a jail policy when no evidence was 
presented of such a policy in place." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Later in his brief, 
Mr. Brown argued, "the district court ... relied on a non-existent jail policy to justify its 
holding .... " It is difficult to imagine a clearer articulation of a challenge to a district 
court's factual finding. 
With respect to the State's incorrect argument that a factual basis existed to 
support the district court's factual findings, the State argues, 
Even if the Court were to require a basis for a warrantless search in the 
screening of outgoing inmate correspondence, the district court found that 
as well. The arguments presented to the district court at [the] hearing on 
the motion to exclude included information of Brown's extensive criminal 
history, his previous possession of identity fraud documents, his 
3 
communications with convicted felons incarcerated elsewhere and his 
continued communications with other people charged with violent crimes, 
all [of] which showed Brown presented security issues to the jail that 
justified the review of his outgoing correspondence. (See generally, 
Tr., pp.368-370.) The district court not only found a valid government 
interest in screening Brown's mail but held the circumstances surrounding 
Brown's behavior and pattern of communications while incarcerated was 
sufficient probable cause to search his mail. (Tr., p.372, Ls.11-19.) The 
district court correctly denied Brown's motion to exclude. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10 (emphasis added).) The State also asserted, without 
citing to any evidence in support, that Mr. Brown's "argument fails" in part because "the 
state acted within its general practice .... " (Respondent's Brief, p.S.) The problem 
with the State's argument is that it incorrectly assumes that the State presented 
evidence at the hearing on Mr. Brown's suppression motion, when the State did nothing 
more than present argument from counsel. 
As Mr. Brown noted in his Appellant's Brief, a warrantless search is presumed to 
be unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment, with the burden on the State 
to establish that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement justifies such a 
search. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) While Mr. Brown does not dispute that the 
prosecuting attorney presented argument on the suppression motion, the State did not 
present any evidence - in the form of affidavits, sworn testimony, or judicially-noticed 
facts - to support those arguments. As such, the district court's factual findings are not 
supported by any evidence - let alone the substantial evidence necessary to allow this 
Court to accept such findings. See State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302 (2007) (on 
appeal, "the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported 
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by substantial evidence .... ,,).1 The absence of any evidence in the record, including a 
copy of any jail policy that was in place at the time of the searches and seizures 
conducted in this case, means that the district court's factual findings are absolutely 
unsupported and cannot be relied upon by this Court on appeal. 
Finally, the State asserts that the "prevailing view" is "that there is no 
constitutional violation in the review of inmate jail [sic]," which is the result of an overly-
broad reading of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Mal/ery and the non-controlling 
authority to which the State also cites. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-9.) The first problem 
with the State's argument is that the Supreme Court's decision in Mal/ery, a habeas 
corpus action brought by inmates of the Canyon County Jail, did not involve the 
wholesale copying and distribution of inmate mail practiced in Mr. Brown's case. The 
facts of Mallery that distinguish it from those of Mr. Brown's case are obvious from the 
following findings of fact made by the district court in Mal/ery, namely, 
[T]hat the inmates' general correspondence, incoming and outgoing, is 
screened by officials, i.e., read for basic content and the envelope 
checked for contraband .... When booked into the jail, prisoners are 
asked to sign a consent form consenting to the screening of general 
correspondence. If the form is not signed, the mail is not screened but 
rather is held until the inmate's release. 
It is clear that the screening of mail for escape plans, obscene material, 
violation of prison rules, and contraband furthers a substantial 
governmental interest .... 
Mallery, 106 Idaho at 232 (emphasis added). In Mr. Brown's case, unlike the facts in 
Mal/ery, the State did not present any evidence that he was made aware of, let alone 
1 It is noteworthy that the State cited to, and quoted from, this portion of Diaz in its 
Respondent's Brief. (Respondent's Brief, p.5.) 
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consented to, the wholesale copying and distribution of his non-privileged mail, which it 
conceded was done in this case. (Tr., p.366, Ls.16-17.) Furthermore, the State did not 
establish, through the presentation of any evidence, that the wholesale copying and 
distribution of Mr. Brown's mail was for institutional security purposes, let alone 
pursuant to an established jail policy. Finally, the wholesale photocopying and 
distribution of Mr. Brown's mail to investigators and the prosecuting attorney's office is a 
far cry from the "screening" of inmate mail described in Mallery and the non-binding 
precedent cited to by the State. 2 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Brown 
respectfully requests that this Court grant the relief that he requested in his Appellant's 
Brief. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2013. 
SPENCERJ.HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
2 The claim brought by the inmates in Mallery involved First Amendment rights, not 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of January, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
KEITH ALLAN BROWN 
INMATE # 18291 
ISCI 
PO BOX 14 
BOISE 10 83707 
FRED GIBLER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
DANIAL SHECKLER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, 10 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
SJH/eas 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
7 
